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In recent years conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have thrust the role of 
proxy forces back into the spotlight. This study examines the past use of proxy forces and the 
potential for improvement based on examples of failures. This study will revolve around the 
question: “How can lessons learned from failures in the use of proxy forces translate into modern 
conflicts.” This study uses two case studies from the Cold War era to highlight factors that led to 
failures in these specific instances. While there are examples of recent proxy force failures there 
is more extensive information available on past examples. 
While much has changed since the Cold War in terms of the geopolitical and 
technological environment, the fundamentals of proxy warfare remain the same, a larger nation 
state funding a smaller resistance group with the goal of either overthrowing a target government 
or achieving another strategic goal. This study discovered that lessons learned from prior failures 
can be useful today. There are some key factors in past failures which can be used as examples 
of how to prevent similar issues in the future, while much has changed since the Cold War some 
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 The use of a subordinate force to achieve regional or political goals has long been a factor 
in conflict. Understanding these conflicts can be crucial to the effective use of similar forces in 
the future. Analyzing failures of proxy forces in present-day warfare can be difficult due to the 
availability of information and potential ongoing operations. The Cold War consisted of great 
power competition and the use of proxy forces. As information has become declassified and 
more in-depth studies have been done there are a wealth of lessons to be learned. This study 
seeks to analyze two of these to better understand what common factors led to failures.  
For the purposes of this paper, “proxy forces” means a sponsored, organized group 
working against a government or country to attempt to accomplish a strategic goal. Vladimir 
Rautin, has offered a succinct summation of the players in proxy conflicts: he posits in such 
conflicts there are a “beneficiary,” “proxy,” and “target.”1 For the purposes of this paper our 
interpretation of this sees the “beneficiary” as a large external nation-state using a smaller 
“proxy” to achieve a goal. The “proxy” is a non-state organization of expatriates and nationals 
conducting operations with funding, training, weapons, and advisement provided by the 
“beneficiary.” The “target” is a nation or ruling party with interests’ counter to the beneficiary’s/ 
proxy’s interests.  
 Because this study seeks to draw lessons from failed proxy wars, it is necessary to define 
what a “failure” in this context. Here, failure refers to cases in which the proxy force fails to 
achieve their strategic goal. This also results in at least the partial failure of the beneficiary to 
 






achieve the goal(s) it was seeking through the use of its proxy, be it a political partnership, a 
larger regional goal, or acquisition of resources.  
 
Based on these criteria this paper uses two case studies.  
1) Congo –1960-1965 the U.S.S.R. backed forces who attempted to overthrow a pro-U.S. 
government, inconsistent support, faulty leadership, and organized opposition ultimately 
resulted in failure. 
2) The Contras in Nicaragua – Partisan forces backed by the U.S. from 1980 until the mid-
1980’s, largely abandoned due to criminal activity on the part of some proxy forces, as 
well as violations of international and domestic law by the CIA and the Reagan 
Administration. 
These two historical examples fit the profile and have enough information available to 
effectively analyze what factors led to failure. This paper will then briefly discuss how lessons 

















A variety of scholars have studied success and failure in proxy wars. Collectively they 
have pointed to at least 3 common causes of failure. The first relates to consistency and sufficient 
levels of support by the beneficiary which is in part a function of politics and fear of larger 
international conflict. The second is alignment of goals between beneficiary and proxy, generally 
the beneficiary is protecting an interest of their own while the proxy is hoping to achieve a 
strategic goal. The third is the quality of cultural awareness by the beneficiary, especially as 
related to leadership of the proxy force, if leadership is unreliable or unable to properly motivate 
their forces the likelihood of success is limited. 
Most modern literature focuses on quasi-terrorist organizations in the Middle East, the 
concept of hybrid warfare and more predominantly counterinsurgency (COIN). Many scholars 
argue that while lessons learned from the Cold War are important, the new age of proxy warfare 
is more complicated. While there are several schools of thought, many scholars agree that the 
current environment in which proxy forces operate is more complex than during the Cold War, 
due to factors including globalization, technological advances, and more complex interstate 
politics. Despite this there is evidence that these lessons are still relevant today. 
A common point that many scholars focus on is that there are a variety of definitional 
issues surrounding proxy forces which influence foreign policy related to it. Vladimir Rauta 
wrote at length of the need to simplify terminology surrounding proxy warfare to better study 
and employ foreign policy surrounding it. He argues that as the phenomenon is studied in 





support in proxy wars) there are a lack of standards in the naming of actors and thus the 
benchmarks and theoretical schools of thought surrounding it.2 
General Joseph L. Votel and Colonel Eero R. Keravuori laid out in a 2018 article in Joint 
Forces Quarterly the tactics that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has started taking with 
regional partners. They reiterated the Army doctrine put forward by former Defense Secretary 
James Mattis, the “By-With-Through” (BWT) operational approach. They posit that U.S. 
operations are led by partners (state or non-state) with U.S. support through U.S. authorities or 
partner agreements, in this article they argue for a more universal application of this approach. In 
the context of non-state partners, they posit that; “The approach pursues more culturally 
acceptable and durable solutions by developing and supporting partner participation and 
operational ownership.” They highlighted the importance of proxy vetting, goal alignment but 
also pointed out the pitfalls; including the tensions between the Syrian Kurds and NATO ally 
Turkey, showing the importance of cultural understanding in the employment of proxy forces.3 
Andrew Mumford, a preeminent figure in the study of proxy forces, argues that Cold War 
conceptions of proxy war were narrow in the sense that they focused on the great power 
‘beneficiaries’ and ignored the role that non-state actors and insurgents play in regional power 
struggles. He highlights the role that pre-existing local tensions played, pointing out that the 
great powers could not have exploited them to vie for regional influence otherwise. He posits 
that Cold War polarity and the threat of nuclear war necessitated ‘indirect intervention’ on the 
part of the superpowers. He notes however that proxies often have their own agenda; “… which 
makes the management of the relationship between the benefactor and the proxy during conflict 
 
2 Rauta, V. (2018). A structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars. International Relations, 32(4), 
449–467. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117818802436 






invariably tricky, especially as proxies begin to develop greater perceptions of autonomy or forge 
differing interpretations of strategic objective to the benefactor.”4 
Idean Salehyan, writes extensively on how modern insurgencies often become 
transnational and lead to cross-border disputes. He argues that these often lead to regional 
conflicts which have the potential to escalate into larger scale international conflicts. He points 
out this could in turn be counterproductive to the goals trying to be achieved by using a proxy 
force in the first place. While his works primarily focus on COIN, he highlights the importance 
of proper management and support of proxy forces in terms of training, equipment, and 
instruction. He notes the pitfalls of such actions, pointing out that strengthening forces with 
questionable allegiance to the target states without integrating them into the existing force 
structure can result in future conflicts.5 
A key component of understanding the importance of the relationship between a 
beneficiary and a proxy comes from Principle-Agent Theory. This theory derives from 
economics and has to do with the delegation of work by a more powerful entity to a smaller one, 
in this context relating the beneficiary to the principle and the proxy to the agent. Several 
prominent scholars in the field apply this theory towards the study of conflicts, specifically 
surrounding interest alignment and resource devotion. Tyler Groh discussed this relationship as 
mutually beneficial, highlighting however the importance of goal alignment to achieve a 
common interest. “In Proxy War, an indigenous actor with knowledge of the local language and 
ability to blend into the environment may not have adequate resources or skills to accomplish its 
 
4 Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict. The RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733 
5 Salehyan, I. (2010). TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCIES AND THE ESCALATION OF REGIONAL CONFLICT: LESSONS 






objectives alone; an intervening state lacking these skills may still be able to accomplish its 
objectives alone but at a significantly higher cost.”6 
 Eli Berman and David Lake wrote extensively on this topic, in their rationale the most 
important aspect in a proxy principal agent relation is interest alignment. They write that; “…the 
alignment of interests, or objectives, between the principle and the agent is of paramount 
importance.”7 Ultimately in their study they concluded that the balance of incentives is crucial, if 
inadequate incentives are provided to a proxy the likelihood of their success is greatly hindered. 
They also found that historically the U.S. is inconsistent in providing incentives to proxies and 
must learn to properly balance incentive and punishment.  
Dr. Geraint Hughes of Kings College in London wrote in his book My Enemy’ Enemy; 
“The extent to which proxies rely on foreign assistance can differ, but the recipients of such aid 
require sufficient indigenous support, tactical sophistication and technological expertise to make 
external support count.”8 While he only briefly touches on the topic of proxy leadership he 
highlights how internal rifts and fear of abandonment can greatly hinder the success of a proxy. 
He touches on the points other authors highlighted on the importance of adequate funding and 
resourcing, consistency of beneficiary support, and goal alignment. 
Former Colonel Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff writes about the moral hazards and risks of the 
employment of proxies, especially as the U.S. shifts to increased employment of such forces in 
lieu of traditional boots on the ground.9 He wrote in a 2018 article for National Interest; 
“…dependence on proxies comes with its own risks and moral hazards. Though Dwight 
 
6 Groh, T. L. (2019). Proxy War: The Least Bad Option (1st ed.). Stanford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqsdq0k 31 
7 Berman, E., & Lake, D. A. (Eds.). (2019). Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents. Cornell 
University Press. 3 
8 Hughes, G. (2012). My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics. Sussex Academic Press. 32 





Eisenhower once called proxy war ‘the cheapest insurance you can find,’ the last seven decades 
of American foreign policy reveal otherwise.” He highlights that while great power competition 
increases, U.S. support for proxies needs to be more calculated to prevent the proxy force from 



































10 C. Anthony Pfaff, P. G. (2018, March 27). How (Not) to Fight Proxy Wars [Text]. The National Interest; The Center 






This research study revolves around the question: “How can lessons learned from past 
failures in the use of proxy forces translate into modern conflicts.” It utilizes social science and 
historical research methods to inductively analyze two case studies from the last century to 
provide a representation of factors which contributed to failures in the use of proxy forces. As 
defined earlier proxy conflicts are delineated by the roles of “beneficiary,” “proxy,” and “target.” 
For the purposes of this study the focus is on historical events in which a beneficiary and proxy 
were unable to achieve their intended goal against the target.  
 Historical examples were chosen due to an abundance of information and analysis on 
them. While it is becoming easier to analyze 21st century proxy conflicts there are still some 















CASE STUDY 1: THE CONGO: 
In the post-WWII world, a wave of decolonization had begun. By 1960 colonial powers 
such as Britain and France had granted independence to countries throughout Africa. Belgium 
was one of the few countries reluctant to relinquish control over their territories. Issues arose as 
Belgium had run their colonies segregated and paternalistically. Black Congolese filled very few 
‘elite’ positions and less than 30 black Congolese throughout the country had received a higher 
education. Political parties were only permitted to be formed in 1958 with significant 
organizations forming by 1959.11 The Belgian Congo had protests and gatherings calling for 
independence since 1954 culminating in riots in late 1959 which forced the Belgian King to 
declare he would negotiate independence for the Congo after 75 years of rule. This was done 
reluctantly as the Congo represented one of the wealthiest African countries at the time due its 
abundance of natural resources in the form of diamonds, copper, cobalt, and uranium. 
 
11 Passemiers, L. (2019). Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the “Congo Crisis”, 1960-1965. 
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Hasty elections were organized as the Belgians set the date of independence for June 30th, 
1960. The party which emerged victorious was Mouvement National Congolese (MNC) led by 
Patrice Lumumba, an activist and anti-Belgian political neutralist who had faced political 
persecution for his efforts to gain independence. Under the complicated parliamentary 
proceedings, power was split with the other leading party ABAKO led by Joseph Kasavubu, a 
moderate politician. Under this agreement Lumumba became Prime Minister and Kasavubu 
President.  
The CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) Africa Division was less than a year old when 
Congo gained independence. They did not have active intelligence officers in the Congo until 
shortly after the election when Lawrence Devlin was sent from Paris to create a station. Devlin 
spoke French but had little understanding of the regional situation in either Africa or the 
Congo.14 Tensions between the Soviets and the U.S. were high after the U.S.S.R. shot down a U2 
spy plane in May. The U.S. was worried about the spread of communist influence to the newly 
independent African states as the Cold War began to heat up.15 
On the day of Congolese Independence, the Belgian King Baudouin delivered a speech to 
the newly formed Congolese parliament which credited the Belgians with the ‘civilization’ of 
Congo. Lumumba proceeded to accuse the Belgians of bringing slavery and oppression, raising 
tension with the Belgians and sending a message to the international community and the 
burgeoning Soviet Union.16 Some Belgians remained after independence to train native 
Congolese in tasks related to national infrastructure and the economy. Within 5 days however the 
Congolese army mutinied demanding promotions in both pay and rank. They took to the streets 
 
14 Prados, J. (2006). Safe for democracy: The secret wars of the CIA. 274 
15 Kalb, M. G. (1982). The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy.10 





looting and harassing white and European civilians, resulting in an exodus and international 
outcry.17   
Lumumba attempted to reorder the military by dismissing Belgian officers and promoting 
Congolese. This initially quelled the troops in the capitol, however chaos spread throughout the 
country. On July 9th amidst the military revolt the newly appointed governor of Katanga 
Province, Moise Tshombe, requested Belgian troops to restore order. Lumumba’s efforts 
achieved little at the national level, and by July 10th Belgium dropped paratroopers throughout 
the country to ‘maintain order’ without the Congolese governments approval.18  
On July 11th, Moishe Tshombe declared the secession of Katanga province. He received 
support from both the Belgian mining companies and government amidst international outcries. 
On July 12th PM Lumumba and President Kasavubu appealed to the U.N. to bring a 
peacekeeping force, citing the Belgian troops’ illegal presence and military instability. When an 
immediate response was not received Lumumba made a public appeal to the Premier of the 
U.S.S.R. Nikita Khrushchev. While there is little evidence of Lumumba being a communist 
sympathizer prior to this, the West was quick to react out of fear of a Soviet occupation in 
Africa.19 
The same day as his appeal the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of Belgian troops and the formation of a military assistance force. Within two days 
peacekeepers from Ghana and Tunisia arrived. Within a week 3500 troops from other African 
countries had arrived on planes supplied and crewed by the U.S. Air Force. U.N. Secretary 
 
17 Passemiers, L. (2019). Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the “Congo Crisis” 20 
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General Dag Hammarskjold (a neutralist) only requested ground troops from African and neutral 
countries. Despite this the Soviet Union expressed outrage at U.S. involvement in the airlift. In a 
propaganda effort they contributed aircraft (5 vs. the US’s 80+ planes and helicopters) to lift 
Soviet food and medical supplies to the Congo. They also lodged complaints with the U.N. 
security council about the lack of Soviet and Eastern European representation as U.N. advisors 
and ground forces.20   
On July 14th Lumumba and Kasavubu returned to the capitol Leopoldville to discover 
Belgian troops occupying the airport. While they were not held or met with violence, Lumumba 
contacted the U.N. announcing a break in diplomatic relations with Belgium. Shortly after this 
Lumumba reached out to Khrushchev asking him to monitor the situation, requesting 
intervention if the West did not order the withdrawal of Belgian forces. While initially 
Khrushchev remained neutral, he issued a statement that if Belgian mercenaries and troops did 
not withdraw the Soviet Union would intervene.21 
While the U.S. was hesitant to engage in a direct confrontation with the Soviets, they 
viewed these statements as posturing. As a result, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. openly 
preferred the U.N. handling of ground operations. The U.N. was also concerned with Soviet 
intervention, Secretary General Hammarskjold and Commander of U.N. forces in the Congo, 
General Carl Von Horn, took a stand of opposition to both Belgian and Soviet intervention. The 
U.S. backed calls for the withdrawal of Belgian forces to deescalate the situation while 
simultaneously both the U.S. State Department and the CIA began to target Lumumba. The 
Belgians agreed to withdraw troops contingent on their replacement with U.N. forces. The 
 
20 Kalb, M. G. (1982). The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy. 19-20 
21 Iandolo, A. (2014). Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961. Journal of Cold War 





Katangese government refused to agree to reintegrate and requested independence. This claim 
was backed by votes of neutrality from the Belgians, the U.N. and the U.S. who considered this 
an internal Congolese issue, hoping that the U.N. presence would encourage an eventual re-
integration.22 
Lumumba visited Washington, D.C., and Canada in late July. He appealed to the State 
Department and the Canadian government for military and economic aid, both reiterated that any 
aid would need to come from the U.N. He subsequently appealed directly to the Soviets for aid. 
Simultaneously the U.S. Ambassador to Congo met with President Eisenhower, CIA Director 
Dulles, and several defense department officials to develop contingency plans in the event of a 
Soviet intervention. At this meeting, Lumumba was brought up, in terms of his removal and of 
finding a suitable replacement. Later Senate and Congressional investigations revealed that an 
alleged assassination plan was brought up at this same meeting.23 
On August 8th, the provincial president of the Congolese Kasai province, Albert Kalonji, 
declared a separate secessionist movement. This was another massive blow to the Lumumba 
government, both economically and bureaucratically, as Kasai produced approximately 60 
percent of the world’s industrial diamonds at the time. On the other side of the country on 
August 12th U.N. troops entered Katanga and relieved the Belgian troops of their command. 
Lumumba had assumed that the U.N. would back a takeover by force and viewed U.N. 
cooperation with the Katangese President Tshombe as a slight. He wrote a series of letters 
 
22 Kalb, M. G. (1982). The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy. 23-33 





denouncing the U.N. Secretary General, driving a wedge between himself, moderate African 
members of the U.N. and the U.S.24  
By late August a covert plan to remove Lumumba was initiated by CIA’s top brass and 
CIA Station Chief Devlin.25 Lumumba had grown distrustful of U.N. intentions and ordered his 
army and police to search for spies which lead to widescale harassment of Europeans and U.N. 
peacekeepers. The CIA and U.S. ambassador were alerted in late August that anti-Lumumba 
government representatives had approached President Kasavubu with a proposal to assassinate 
Lumumba which was rejected. The turning point came when Lumumba fielded a plan to invade 
both Katanga and Kasai using the ANC (the Congolese Army). In late August, the governments 
of Katanga and Kasai signed a confederacy against the central government. Kasai was less well 
funded and had a less significant defense force compared to Katanga. In Late August Lumumba 
ordered his troops to retake Kasai, resulting in a military failure and the massacre of local 
tribespeople which lost him domestic and international support.26 
In secret Lumumba had secured arms shipments from the Soviets which he had expected 
to arrive in time for the invasion of Katanga, however, he preemptively started the invasion 
before the Soviet arms arrived. In a press conference he hinted at Soviet aid which alerted the 
U.S. and the U.N. to his machinations. On September 1st in the midst of Lumumba’s faltering 
military campaign, and tensions after a conference with the newly formed African Council, the 
Soviet planes bearing arms arrived in Congo sparking international outcry from the U.N. and 
neighboring neutral African countries.27  
 
24 Kalb, M. G. (1982). The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy. 48-51 
25 Prados, J. (2006). Safe for democracy: The secret wars of the CIA. 275 
26 Passemiers, L. (2019). Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the “Congo Crisis” 23-24 





On September 5th Congolese President Kasavubu announced the removal of Lumumba 
with blessings from the U.S. Ambassador and the U.N. Deputy Secretary General. Lumumba 
commandeered radio networks to protest the legality of these claims, appealing to the Congolese 
parliament to overturn the decision and vote Kasavubu out of the presidency. Both Votes did not 
have a consistent turnout and were attended by police and army personnel loyal to Lumumba.28 
The U.N. swiftly seized control of the radio stations and closed the airports to prevent further 
Soviet aid. On September 14th, the new commander of the ANC Colonel Joseph Mobutu initiated 
a coup, announcing the suspension of the Congolese government until the end of the year and 
ordering the arrest of Lumumba.  
In the week after Kasavubu’s announcement Mobutu had approached the U.S. State Dept 
and the CIA for support. In the aftermath of the coup they quickly backed him. While the plot to 
assassinate Lumumba carried on, CIA Station Chief Devlin stalled. Devlin preferred a Congolese 
backed solution to Headquarters’ plot to poison Lumumba.29 The CIA provided information to 
Mobutu of an assassination attempt shortly after his assumption of power. The plot was foiled, 
and Mobutu became more active in his communication with the CIA. Mobutu ordered the 
withdrawal of Soviet and Czech diplomats on September 15th, forcing their departure by 
September 17th. 
Lumumba was put under house arrest under protection by U.N. forces, occasionally 
venturing out to try to rally support for his cause. By mid-October Mobutu’s forces had 
attempted to arrest Lumumba at his residence multiple times, each was rejected by the U.N. 
forces guarding him. In mid-November Lumumba’s followers, led by his former Deputy Prime 
 
28 Kalb, M. G. (1982). The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy. 70-75 





Minister Antoine Gizenga, set up a rival government in Stanleyville, the capital of the Orientale 
Province. Lumumba managed to escape house arrest and attempted to make it to Stanleyville, 
only to be arrested on December 1st.30 
After Lumumba’s arrest Gizenga assumed control of the pro-Lumumba movement 
declaring himself acting Prime Minister of the ‘legitimate government’. He immediately reached 
out to the Soviets requesting both military and humanitarian aid. Khrushchev was slow to 
respond, largely due to the inconsistency of Lumumba and his subsequent capture.31 The Soviets 
sent a shipment of arms to the pro-Lumumba group which arrived December 15th but was 
immediately reported by a New York Times article.32 The U.S. State Department and the CIA 
sent alerts to allied countries throughout Europe and the Mediterranean to inspect Soviet aircraft 
headed to Africa. The CIA also fielded a team in Congo to intercept arms shipments and monitor 
Soviet activity. The Soviets were operating on limited intelligence without their embassies or a 
solid support group on the ground, and thus were constricted in their ability to provide support to 
the Gizenga group.33 
In mid-January, a prison flight containing Lumumba was diverted to Katanga where he 
was brutally beaten and subsequently murdered by the Katangese military. The degree of CIA 
involvement is unclear, however Belgian officers were involved in his death, as the Belgians had 
invested a great deal of money and intelligence assets into the hunt for Lumumba. The news of 
 
30 Passemiers, L. (2019). Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the “Congo Crisis” 24-25 
31 Mazov, S. (2007). Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61) as Reflected in 
Russian Archives. Cold War History, 5 
32 Hoffman, P. (1960, December 15). LUMUMBA GROUP SAID TO GET ARMS; Stanleyville Reported to Get Aid in 
Red Planes—Congo Army Seeks U.N. Base (Published 1960). The New York Times. 
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his death did not emerge until February, after the inauguration of President John F Kennedy Jr. 
JFK publicly dejected the act while privately his ‘Special Group’ responsible for covert action 
planning (carried over from the previous administrations ‘5412 group’) provided another half 
million dollars to the Congo project.34   
With an effective U.N. and NATO blockade in place restricting Soviet arms shipments to 
the Congo Khrushchev appealed to allied countries in the region to provide financial assistance 
to Gizenga. Gizenga’s army was professional, and without funding would not fight. They were 
primarily tasked with repelling attacks by Mobutu’s forces, maintaining security of the Orientale 
province and attempting to seize the Northern region of neighboring Katanga. Czech attempts to 
establish an airlift and Soviet appeals to Egypt and African allies to aid Gizenga all failed. 
International pressure and shifting confidence in the ability of Congolese opposition to triumph 
greatly hindered support.35 The CIA covertly sabotaged arms shipments to expose efforts to 
smuggle weapons through Sudan and intercepted Soviet money in transit. Gizenga’s troops 
began robbing to subsist and Gizenga’s party lost support as a result.36 Ultimately this led the 
Soviets to largely abandon efforts to support Gizenga and their opposition movement. 
In August 1961, the Kasavubu government, which was still primarily operated by 
Mobutu, appointed former Lumumba moderate Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister. He took a 
hardline approach to ending secessionist movements in the various Congolese provinces. The 
U.N. grew increasingly frustrated with the Katanga government after the suspicious death of 
U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld. His plane went down in September 1961 while visiting 
 
34 Prados, J. (2006). Safe for democracy: The secret wars of the CIA. 277-278 
35 Mazov, S. (2007). Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61) as Reflected in 
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Katanga, and evidence suggested it may have been shot down by Belgian mercenaries.37 The 
U.N. launched an offensive against the Tshombe government, leading to a failed peace 
settlement with the Mobutu government. Mobutu’s forces launched an offensive against the 
Gizenga government in the Orientale province and the secessionist movement in Kasai at the 
start of 1962, toppling both governments. Mobutu and the U.N. launched a series of offensives, 
coupled with an economic embargo, which brought an end to the Tshombe government in 
1963.38 
While rebellions continued through the rest of the decade the Soviets had abandoned their 
efforts by the end of 1961, Khrushchev’s empty threats and inconsistent support of the 
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CASE STUDY 2: THE CONTRAS: 
 In 1961 in Nicaragua a nominally Marxist group called the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front, better known as the Sandinistas, formed with the goal of seizing control of 
Nicaragua from Anastasio Somoza. Somoza was a long-standing dictator who had some backing 
from the United States due to his far-right stance and support for U.S. interests in the region. In 
the early 1960’s the Sandinistas began an armed insurgency against the Somoza government.  
The Sandinistas gradually gained the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba, who 
provided supplies and funding. After years of fighting an insurgency style warfare the 
Sandinistas gained popular support across Nicaragua. In 1979 the Sandinistas led a national 
uprising, where they seized control and dissolved the Somoza government and National Guard. 
With support from the U.S.S.R. the Sandinistas established their own government which was left 
leaning but not Marxist. Under then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter, no action was initially taken 
against the Sandinista government. In 1981, the new administration of Ronald Reagan began to 
put pressure on the Sandinista government by withdrawing economic assistance and 
implementing sanctions.  
Reagans conservative stance saw revolutions and leftism in Central and South America as 
the work of communist agitators funded or inspired by Cuba and the Soviet Union. Under 
President Reagan, William Casey, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the WWII 
predecessor to the CIA, was appointed Director of the CIA. Casey was tasked with increasing 
covert, paramilitary and political action to staunch the global spread of communism, especially 
in Central and South America. Reagan viewed the El Salvadorian Civil War, which raged in 





Salvadoran revolutionaries, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), with arms 
and aid.  
In the wake of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua several counter-revolutionary 
groups formed. The most prominent was the 15th September Legion composed of former 
members of Somoza’s National Guard. In 1979 they set up an exile base in Honduras, the United 
States did not provide them with aid initially due to their negative human rights during the 
revolution. An independent group consisting of Nicaraguan civilian exiles had emigrated to the 
United States and began preparing for a counter revolution in 1980, with some training camps 
run by Cuban exiles springing up in Florida.  
Reagan set the wheels in motion to frame American support for resistance groups as 
necessary to interdict arms bound for El Salvador and fight communism in the region. Casey 
concocted a plan to launch a political action and psychological operations campaign to halt arms 
shipments from the Sandinistas to the FMLN with the larger goal being the removal of the 
Sandinistas from power. 
In May 1981, a Central American Station reported that the ADREN, Nicaraguan 
Democratic Union (UDN) and MISURASATA had agreed in principle to combine forces 
in a new organization. They would continue to use the name 15th of September Legion 
for the organization's military arm. The new organization, the Nicaraguan Democratic 
Force (FDN), was established in September 1981. The FDN General Staff included 
Enrique Bermudez, Justiniano Perez, Ricardo Lau, and Juan Francisco Rivera.40 
 
In late 1981 President Reagan signed a Presidential Finding authorizing the Director of 
the CIA to launch a covert paramilitary war against Nicaragua. This finding assigned $19 million 
to conduct paramilitary operations in Nicaragua to interdict arms being supplied to the 
 






Salvadoran revolutionaries by the Nicaraguan government.41 Later, intelligence officials disputed 
this, however it set in motion the founding of a more significant proxy force to overthrow the 
Sandinistas. 
 The U.S. first ran training out of Argentina with their permission, before moving training 
and operations to newly built bases in Honduras. The contras were poorly equipped and most of 
their activities against Nicaragua consisted of small skirmishes and cattle rustling. CIA-supplied 
weapons arrived in Honduras in early 1982. The first significant strikes were attacks against road 
bridges in mid-March, after which the Sandinistas declared a state of emergency.42 The 
Sandinista government tightened security, as a result unrest broke out and arrests of Nicaraguan 
Indians resulted in the solidification of another anti-Sandinista organization; the MISURASATA. 
 By mid-1982 the new head of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) Latin America 
Division Duane Clarridge, had established several CIA and Contra bases in Honduras. The 
CIA’s primary base was leased from the Honduran air force and constructed at El Aguacate air 
base. From this site they coordinated Contra activity, supplies and arms, air attacks in Nicaragua, 
and assisted the Honduran air force with strikes against the FMLN in El Salvador. Issues 
immediately arose as CIA Director Casey and DO Clarridge had staffed key positions with CIA 
employees who had a South East Asia background instead of Latin American, many of whom 
did not speak Spanish.43  
The Nicaragua project gained an additional ally in former Sandinistas in Costa Rica 
operating under the name Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE) led by Alfonso Robelo 
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and Pastora Gomez. The ARDE requested CIA support to aid in their fight against the 
Sandinistas. Some logistical issues presented themselves after the Falklands War between 
Argentina and Britain. Reagan sided with the U.K. over the conflict and Argentina withdrew 
support for the Contras which forced complete operation out of Honduras. 
Although some exposes had started to unravel the secrecy of the clandestine support for 
the Contras, a November 1982 Newsweek article revealed the size of the Contra movement and 
reported CIA involvement44. This created a firestorm in terms of attention, international 
condemnation, and pressure in American domestic politics. Congressman Edward Boland (D-
MA) who was Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee drafted an amendment prohibiting 
the use of funds for overthrowing the Nicaraguan government which became law December 21st, 
1982.45 A loophole existed in the Boland Amendment however, if the U.S. was not directly 
involved in planning the overthrow of the Sandinista government, aid to the Contras could 
continue, and thus operations in Nicaragua remained largely the same. 
With additional scrutiny after congressional inquiries following the Newsweek, the CIA 
forced the FDN to diversify leadership. Much of the FDNs military and political leadership were 
former Somoza National Guards which drew international condemnation. As a result, they 
created a ‘congress’ consisting of 8 civilian and 5 military leaders. The FDN board was led by 
Adolfo Calero who became the public face of the FDN, while military operations remained 
under Col. Bermudez. By the end of 1982 with issues surrounding resources, allies, and bases the 
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Contra plan to seize and hold territory to declare a provisional government never occurred 
despite weaknesses within the Sandinista government.46  
In fiscal year 1983 Reagan increased the funding to the Contras to $21 million. Although 
Contra forces had grown since 1982, CIA analysts and the Honduran government were skeptical 
of the ability of the Contras to perform due to the limited success of their actions up to this point. 
There were internal issues among the anti-Sandinista forces, both within the ARDE and the 
FDN. While Calero and the ‘congress’ were considered the leaders of the FDN, Bermudez 
retained control of the military branch and thus a large portion of control over the organization. 
“In January 1983, he identified himself as the FDN directorate member responsible for military 
affairs and effectively the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ of FDN forces.”47 The ARDE in Costa Rica 
had been inactive militarily and rejected any former Nicaraguan military members, which led 
them to remain operationally stagnant and ineffective due to a lack of military practitioners. 
The FDN, at the urging of the CIA, adopted a new public voice in the form of Edgar 
Chamorro, a moderate, influential, and less controversial Nicaraguan exile. Around this time 
allegations of human rights abuses began to tarnish the image of the FDN, made worse when 
Chamorro partially admitted abuses in an interview. In response the CIA created a warfare 
conduct manual for the FDN. A former Green Beret and CIA operative “Tayacan” put together a 
manual called “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare” pulled primarily from Vietnam 
War manuals48. It called for drastic actions such as kidnapping, assassinations, hiring criminal 
gangs and inciting riots. This proved counterproductive, and reinforced actions already 
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conducted by the Contras. The document was leaked in 1984 and caused a scandal with the 
media who called it an insurgency manual.49 
During this period, the CIA maintained some of its advisory role, albeit it with a lack of 
direct military funding or support. After the Boland I amendment the lines were unclear as to 
where CIA could and could not assist. The CIA pressured the White House and in September 
1983 Reagan revised his original Presidential Finding to allow for U.S. support of paramilitary 
operations against Nicaragua in an effort to force the Cubans to reduce support for hostile 
regimes in the region.50 
 Prior to the revised Presidential Finding the CIA had begun developing a plan to disrupt 
the Nicaraguan economy via their oil supply and arms trade by disrupting shipping. The CIA 
developed their own mines for this operation at the Naval Surface Weapons Center prior to 
authorization to conduct the mission. Their mines utilized a design in which a sewer pipe was 
stuffed with C4 and was triggered by an acoustic sensor. The CIA nicknamed them ‘Firecracker’ 
mines and planned to lay them in various harbors along the Nicaraguan coast.  
In the summer of 1983, the idea was pitched to Reagan and rejected, but a less 
aggressively worded version was vaguely approved by a smaller decision-making body, the 
Restricted Interagency Group. Clarridge sought the acquisition of armed fast boats capable of 
laying mines and a mother ship to launch them from. In late 1983, the NSPG debated the plan, 
voicing concerns over the implications of potentially sinking a Russian vessel. In the end Reagan 
approved the plan which was initiated in the fall of 1983. CIA-directed commandos began 
rocketing oil storage facilities in the port of Corinto, which led to fires destroying essential 
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Nicaraguan goods and forcing mass evacuations. CIA-Supplied aircraft also conducted bombing 
raids on Nicaragua’s international airport in Managua. At the start of 1984, the CIA began laying 
mines in Nicaraguan ports51 
The Nicaraguans attempted to counter these actions by establishing an offshore security 
zone 25 miles from their shores. The effect of the mining took a toll on the Nicaraguan people as 
oil shortages loomed and port fires threatened homes near oil storage facilities. The CIA had the 
FDN declare that the mines were theirs and that all Nicaraguan ports were a ‘danger zone.’ The 
reasoning behind this was the Hague Convention of 1907. The ‘Convention Relative to the 
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines’ which both the U.S. and Nicaragua were party 
to; “…makes it illegal to mine the coast or ports of an enemy even during times of war for the 
sole purpose of intercepting commercial shipping, or to lay unanchored contact mines.”52 By 
having the FDN claim responsibility and designate danger zones they avoided international 
scrutiny.  
 On March 20th, 1984, a Soviet tanker the ‘Lugansk’ struck one of the mines, damaging 
the ship and injuring four sailors53. The Soviets blamed the U.S. and the CIA scrambled to have 
the FDN deny that the damage could have been caused by their mines. Despite the attempt to 
warn vessels of the danger zones, by April 1984 at least 8 ships from multiple nations were 
damaged by the mines.54 CIA paramilitary forces raided a number of ports along the coast 
damaging oil storage and Nicaraguan naval vessels. An April Wall Street Journal article and 
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PBS News piece exposed the role of the CIA in the mine operation and congressional pressure 
came to a head.55 
 The Wall Street Journal stoked domestic and international criticism of the conflict. 
Nicaragua brought an International Court of Justice (ICJ) suit against the United States on April 
9th of 1984 for violations of international law regarding both the mining and support for the 
contras. Amid this international attention, the Miskito Indian resistance (MISURASATA) 
dissolved after negotiations with the Sandinistas, a large factor being the devotion of resources to 
the FDN over them. In June, the ARDE began to fall apart as Costa Rica cracked down in a bid 
to show neutrality towards Nicaragua. 
Around this time CIA Director Casey sensed impending trouble and contacted U.S. 
Marine Colonel Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council. Oliver North served 
under Robert McFarlane who was Reagans National Security Advisor. Casey’s rationale was that 
the NSC was not under the same congressional restrictions as the CIA. North began to play a 
more central role in the ‘Secret War’ and was introduced to the Contras shortly thereafter by 
CIA’s Dewey Clarridge. 
 In lieu of all the controversy the U.S. Congress moved to cut both CIA and American aid 
to the contras. On October 12th, 1984 it passed the Second Boland Amendment which mandated 
that; 
During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in 
intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have 
 







the effect of supporting directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in 
Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.56 
 
The FDN suffered drastically in the immediate aftermath of the funding cut and remained 
operationally inactive for the end of 1984. The United States officially cut funding to the Contras 
in 1985, forcing them to turn to third party funding. The Contras sought private funding in the 
U.S. but were unable to meet their requirement of approximately $1 million a month to maintain 
their forces. North, with minimal input from the CIA and Director Casey, was able to secure 
Saudi Arabian funding in $1 million increments funneled to FDN’s Adolfo Calero. While the 
CIA was officially directed to cease assistance to the Contras, Director Casey did what he could 
to help. Alan Fiers had been appointed Chief of the CIA’s Central America Task Force (CATF) 
in October 1984. Fiers followed congressional guidance but retained knowledge of North’s 
Operations in the region and shared the belief the FDN was failing.57   
In November 1984, Ronald Reagan was re-elected and continued his public show of 
commitment to the Contras in his speeches and general rhetoric. Oliver North continued to work 
independently of the CIA to secure funding for the Contras. The United Nicaraguan Opposition 
(UNO) group was set up in Washington D.C. by conservative colleagues of Reagan to aid in 
lobbying efforts and to serve as a source for arms supplies. Conservative lobbyists in D.C. raised 
more than $6 million through the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty 
foundation.58 North worked with Retired U.S. Air Force General Richard Secord and Albert 
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Hakim, an Iranian businessman, to supply the Contras with arms. Their first agreement was 
secured November of 1984 and arms began shipping mid-1985.59 
From February 1985 on, Oliver North provided counseling and intelligence to the 
Contras, funneled from the NSC and CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. He 
attempted to push the FDN to mount larger scale offensives to gain ground, operations up to this 
point had failed to do so. His activities began to catch the attention of the House Intelligence and 
House Foreign Affairs Latin America Subcommittee.60 During the funding and support cutbacks 
at the start of 1985 the Contras logistics and operational efficiency started to fall apart. To revive 
the Contras ability to resupply frontline troops with weapons and equipment North began 
concocting a plan to provide the FDN with air support.  
Utilizing Secord, a privately funded airstrip was built in Costa Rica with a plan to be 
operational by mid-1986. 61 There were some issues in organizing this operation in Costa Rica 
due to the faltering ARDE and existing tensions surrounding the presence of Nicaraguan fighters. 
North approached the Ambassador to Costa Rica to negotiate access to an airstrip, convincing 
the Costa Ricans that they would have less Contras on their territory as a result. North utilized 
contacts gained through Secord to begin construction of the airfield while the CIA station chief 
looked the other way. 
Unaware of the third-party dealings by Oliver North designed to skirt the Boland II 
amendment, Congress began to renegotiate funding based on public support and political 
pressure. By June 1985 Congress agreed to supply humanitarian aid to the Contras in the form of 
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$27 million. An incursion into Honduran Territory by Nicaragua in pursuit of Contra forces 
swayed Congress into approving an additional $100 million by October 1986, 70% of which was 
designated as military aid.62 
 North utilized the air services operating from Costa Rica to fly the U.S. humanitarian aid 
from the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) into Nicaragua. Gen. Secord 
tasked former Air Force Colonel Richard Gadd with constructing a small air fleet and crews 
consisting of former CIA contract pilots from Vietnam’s Air America campaign. Many of these 
pilots believed they were still working for the CIA. Around this time North connected with Felix 
Rodriguez, a former CIA paramilitary officer involved in the Bay of Pigs, the hunt for Che 
Guevara and Vietnam. Rodriguez was working with the El Salvadoran government and air force 
at the time and North recruited him to liaise between the Salvadoran government and third 
parties to fly supplies to the Contras out of Ilopango air base.63 
 The operation was not nearly as efficient as North had hoped, due to questionable 
characters working on the project and the secondhand aircraft they acquired being not well 
maintained. Issues also began to arise when members of the Contras pushed the CIA to provide 
them with intelligence to better operate in the region. These factors greatly contributed to 
extended delays in the resupply of Contra operatives both in Nicaragua and in Honduras. The 
first arms delivery to the Contras was not until April 1986 and deliveries were inconsistent.64  
Congress passed The Intelligence Authorization Bill in 1986 which allowed the CIA to 
provide training and intelligence to the Contras but prohibited paramilitary operations or 
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logistical support of paramilitary operations.65 The CIA provided encrypted communication 
devices to the Contras worth approximately $13 million dollars which freed up Contra money to 
purchase more arms and supplies. Almost immediately however Communist assistance to the 
Sandinistas rendered the encryption devices useless, after cracking the cypher they were able to 
track Contra movements.66  
 During this time, North concocted a plan which ended up being the downfall of his side 
of operations.  He proposed diverting money from American arms sales to Iran to the Contras. 
Starting in 1985 the United States and Israel had been discreetly selling arms to Iran. In February 
of 1986, the U.S. had covertly agreed to trade arms for American hostages. While the money that 
Oliver North planned to divert was a small percentage of these deals it still amounted to a 
significant overstep on his part. He also sought to utilize the Contra resupply planes to facilitate 
the trade of the weapons. 
A major accounting error further complicated funding efforts in August of 1986 when the 
Sultan of Brunei was approached for funding. Money was deposited into the wrong account and 
a slew of legal proceedings were required to get the funds back which drew more public attention 
to the operation.67 To make matters worse public allegations began to emerge concerning Contra 
drug smuggling to raise additional funds for their operations, utilizing Norths planes to do so. 
Norths own reports indicated his knowledge of these operations.68 
On October 5th, 1986, an FDN supply plane was shot down by the Sandinistas and one of 
the primarily American crew, Eugene Hasenfus, was captured alive. He falsely informed the 
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Nicaraguans that the plane belonged to the CIA. The plane’s flight log was recovered from the 
wreckage which revealed the planes arms flights and several drug related flights to the United 
States.69 It was also revealed the plane had been used in an attempted drug entrapment scheme 
against the Sandinistas prior to its use for the Contra supply missions.70 
The Reagan Administration quickly denied U.S. and CIA involvement, leading Congress 
to not pry too deeply. In late October 1986, the first shipment of arms was sent to Iran and a 
portion of the money was funneled to the Contras. In November several Lebanese newspapers 
circulated stories regarding the arms sales and the U.S.’s involvement.71 Congress quickly 
moved to investigate the allegations of CIA involvement in the Contra conflict, Contra drug 
smuggling and the questionable funding sources associated with the air transportation 
companies.  
On November 25th, the Reagan administration admitted to the arms for hostage sales and 
the diversion of funds to the Contras. This set about a government wide purge and reforms to the 
purview of the NSC as well as restrictions on Presidential Findings. The Iran-Contra scandal as it 
became known set a precedent for Congressional oversight and checks and balances. Severe 
restrictions and scrutiny stymied the Contra operation and by 1988 CIA and U.S. aid to the 
Contras all but ceased while Honduras and Costa Rica condemned the operation. Eventually U.S. 
support resumed and the Contras ultimately capitulated with the Sandinista government, the 
successes of the Contras as a proxy force was negligible considering their ineffectiveness as a 
fighting force given the amount of resources devoted to the project. 
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  As seen in the literature review scholars pointed to several major factors contributing to 
success or failure in the use of proxy forces. The primary factors identified were consistency and 
levels of support by the beneficiary, goal alignment between the proxy and beneficiary, and the 
quality of cultural awareness as it relates to proxy force leadership and composition. In the two 
cases analyzed in this study we saw evidence of all of factors contributing to the failure of these 
forces to operate effectively.  
While there had been some minor proxy conflicts in the post-World War era Congo 
represented the beginning of Soviet attempts to expand their global influence through the support 
of revolutions and anti-Western groups. While there were a variety of factors in the failures of 
both Lumumba and Gizenga to manifest significant or lasting power in the Congo, Soviet 
hesitancy to commit, and their withdrawal of support played a large role. The lack of consistent 
opposition leadership and the cohesiveness of the anti-Western forces also played a significant 
role. Additionally, the U.N. backed forces proved more effective in consolidating divided and 
non-aligned parties. 
 Alessandro Iandolo wrote of the Soviet role in these failures that their ability to 
effectively back forces abroad were tested and failed. He highlighted that their commitment to 
their allies was inconsistent due to their fear of sparking a direct military confrontation with the 
west.72 In addition, after the ouster of their embassies and diplomatic staff they lacked reliable 
intelligence with which to act upon and support their allies, and were unable to consistently 
support their proxy. Their reluctance to commit to a new leader after the ouster of Lumumba, the 
 





U.N. blockade of Gizenga’s Orientale province and CIA sabotage of arms and fund supplies led 
the Soviets to abandon the Congo all together.73 
 Lumumba’s rash actions and inconsistency in relations with both the Western coalition 
and the Russians led to a break with President Kasavubu, which in turn led to a coup by Colonel 
Mobutu. After Lumumba’s arrest and subsequent death his party was divided and led by a less 
polarizing leader, Gizenga. Gizenga relied on a professional army, funded by the Soviets, with 
few loyalists motivated by ideology. All the aforementioned factors which produced Soviet 
withdrawal of support forced him to capitulate.74  
 With the Contras there were several major factors which led to their failure. Some of the 
factors overlapped with the situation in the Congo, namely; ineffective and divided proxy force 
leadership, inconsistent support and strategy on the part of the beneficiary, and a failure to 
mobilize popular support within the target nation by the proxy. The Iran-Contra scandal also led 
to limitations on American support, with the conflict ending in a stalemate, withdrawal of 
American support and the election of UNO to power in Nicaragua in 1990. While this could in 
some ways be considered a victory, the effectiveness of the proxy force to win outright was 
never demonstrated. 
 Contra leadership was dominated from the beginning by former Somoza National Guard 
members who had a history of human rights abuses and acted more as criminals than 
revolutionaries. Once U.S. support began flowing the tempo of attacks against Nicaragua 
intensified and international scrutiny factored in. Leadership of the FDN was diversified and the 
CIA attempted to implement more professional standards, however military affairs and the real 
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seat of power was still occupied by Bermudez. There were more atrocities and military blunders 
which further ruined the credibility of the Contra forces both within the region and 
internationally.75 
 With a series of funding fluctuations due to CIA mismanagement, Executive branch acts, 
and a shift to third party funding, the Contras were consistently worried about supplying their 
war effort. When funding dried up, as it did in 1984, Contra forces remained inactive, losing any 
ground gained and becoming demoralized.76 While the Contras received a significant amount of 
funds from third parties for military purposes (mostly provided by Saudi Arabia who contributed 
approximately $32 million between 1984 and 198677), they still lacked a solid strategy and 
cohesive leadership. 
 Some opponents of the Contra movement and U.S. support for it argue against the 
legitimacy of their cause. During the first few years of the conflict the Sandinista government, 
despite U.S. claims to the contrary, enjoyed widespread popular support. As the war raged on, 
government crackdowns and the effects of international embargoes factored in, they lost popular 
support, which paved the way for the eventual concession with the Contra movement. A 1988 
article in the Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies stated; “One of the 
most remarkable aspects of the FDN is that until November 1986 it had made very few efforts to 
develop a complete, coherent political programme beyond a brief statement of its war aims.”78 
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This lack of appeal to the Nicaraguan populace and controversial military campaign contributed 
to a failure of the Contras to gain popular support both within Nicaragua and abroad. 
 Clearly there are some commonalities between these two cases, the bipolarity of the Cold 
War and the conflict between Western ideals and communist systems exacerbated pre-existing 
societal fissures, manifesting in civil wars fought with weapons and money supplied by rival 
superpower beneficiaries. A failure to properly vet proxy force leaders, mismanagement of 
resources and failure to fully commit on the part of the beneficiaries led to lack of cohesion 
within these proxy forces. Indeed, lessons learned from these conflicts must have been factored 
into support for proxy forces since, and clearly factors that led to the failure of these forces is 
relevant today. With conflicts spread across multiple regions and the capabilities of proxy forces 
greatly magnified through technology, both on a social and military scale, the proxy environment 
is more evolved than in the Cold War, however the above elements remain the same. 
 As the literature review showed many modern scholars share the belief that Cold War 
examples are narrow in their scope. Sterman and Rondeaux wrote in 2019: “The literature on 
state sponsorship of terrorism is predominantly rooted in Cold War conceptions that emphasize 
the power of highly centralized states and their influence over non-state proxies rather than the 
agency of groups themselves.”79 They also argue that current analytical works do not account for 
the paradigm shift that is occurring because of communications and weapon innovations, as well 
as the rise of transnational social movements.80 While this may indeed be true, in this context of 
this study I believe that the failures exhibited in Cold War proxy conflicts can be valuable 
‘lessons learned’ with regards to this exact issue.  
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In both the Congo and Nicaragua it was apparent that too little research was done by the 
beneficiaries before support was given, with too little effort extended on the part of the 
benefactors to accurately gauge the goals, limitations and potential pitfalls of backing these 
proxy forces. In addition, the experts dealing with the proxy forces were ignorant of the regions 
and cultures they were dealing with. Prados wrote that the CIA’s DO Africa Division was less 
than a year old at the outbreak of Congolese independence and the first station chief Larry 
Devlin, was previously stationed in Paris and had next to no experience with Africa, did not 
arrive in the Congo to set up a CIA base until shortly after this.81 
 Throughout the duration of CIA support for the Contra conflict, Duane Clarridge was the 
head of the DO’s Latin America Division. Clarridge was a Middle East expert with no Latin 
America experience and did not speak Spanish. The station chief of the frontline CIA base at 
Aguacate in Honduras Ray Doty and many of the other CIA liaisons to the Contras were Laos 
experts who also spoke little to no Spanish.82 A lack of cultural and regional understanding 
surely had to have an impact on the efficacy of their mission and guidance to the Contras. While 
in both conflicts relations with neighboring countries and rival benefactors were factored into the 
political considerations of the proxy conflicts, as the literature suggests, the agency of the proxies 
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While some elements have changed since the Cold War it seems the fundamentals are the 
same. The question of whether lessons learned from the use of proxies during the Cold War are 
applicable to the modern environment proved to be true to a certain extent. While technological 
and global interconnectedness has evolved, organizational, and political risk factors are still 
similar. There is no arguing that the world is very different than it was 60 years ago, however the 
human and political factors remain strikingly similar. 
Key takeaways such as the importance of goal-alignment between beneficiary and proxy, 
vetting of proxy leadership and solid strategic and support planning on the part of beneficiary are 
still applicable today. While it can be difficult to associate one conflict with another enough 
similarities exist between all conflicts to relate them to each other. Using the key factors 
identified in this study, in-depth studies of modern proxy conflicts and factors which contributed 
to their failures and successes could be useful for future applications.  
Clearly more analytical rigor must be given to the topic of proxy warfare as our 
opponents continue to use proxies and hybrid warfare methods to expand their spheres of 
influence and threaten U.S. interests globally. As the U.S. popular opinion towards devotion of 
resources to traditional warfighting and COIN wanes, it is imperative that the U.S. military and 
intelligence community work to bolster their ability to find, support and commit to allies, both 
state and non-state, with interests and goals in line with ours. If the last decade was any 
indication, the next several decades will likely see a massive surge in proxy conflicts. It will be a 
key aspect of U.S. foreign policy and power projection to be able to effectively work with non-
state groups effectively, however to do so it appears that more research needs to be done 
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